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23048d10ac07fbc0b84603a6c1ce13396ad7c280
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6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
fettpl
23048d10ac refactor: simplify hash_token using format macro 
Replace manual hex encoding loop with `format!("{:x}", Sha256::digest(...))`,
which is more idiomatic and concise.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-02-15 00:28:04 +01:00
fettpl
b3bfbaff4a fix: store bearer tokens as SHA-256 hashes instead of plaintext 
Hash paired bearer tokens with SHA-256 before storing in config and
in-memory. When authenticating, hash the incoming token and compare
against stored hashes. Backward compatible: existing plaintext tokens
(zc_ prefix) are detected and hashed on load; already-hashed tokens
(64-char hex) are stored as-is.

Closes #58

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-02-14 23:58:09 +01:00
Víctor R. Escobar
1c8fe79238 fix: address PR review — rejection sampling and robust test 
- Use rejection sampling to eliminate modulo bias in generate_code().
  Values above the largest multiple of 1_000_000 in u32 are discarded
  and re-drawn (~0.02% rejection rate).
- Make generate_code_is_not_deterministic test robust against the
  1-in-10^6 collision chance by trying 10 pairs instead of one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-02-14 13:48:36 +01:00
Víctor R. Escobar
15a58eb7da fix: use CSPRNG for pairing code generation 
Replace DefaultHasher + SystemTime + process::id() with UUID v4
(backed by getrandom/urandom CSPRNG) for pairing code generation.

The previous implementation used predictable entropy sources
(system time to ~1s precision and process ID) with a non-cryptographic
hash (SipHash), making the 6-digit code brute-forceable.

The new implementation extracts 4 random bytes from a UUID v4
(which uses the OS CSPRNG) and derives the 6-digit code from those.
No new dependencies added — reuses existing uuid crate.

Adds a test verifying non-deterministic output.

Ref: CWE-330 (Use of Insufficiently Random Values)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-02-14 13:29:58 +01:00
argenis de la rosa
976c5bbf3c hardening: fix 7 production weaknesses found in codebase scan 
Scan findings and fixes:

1. Gateway buffer overflow (8KB → 64KB)
   - Fixed: Increased request buffer from 8,192 to 65,536 bytes
   - Large POST bodies (long prompts) were silently truncated

2. Gateway slow-loris attack (no read timeout → 30s)
   - Fixed: tokio::time::timeout(30s) on stream.read()
   - Malicious clients could hold connections indefinitely

3. Webhook secret timing attack (== → constant_time_eq)
   - Fixed: Now uses constant_time_eq() for secret comparison
   - Prevents timing side-channel on webhook authentication

4. Pairing brute force (no limit → 5 attempts + 5min lockout)
   - Fixed: PairingGuard tracks failed attempts with lockout
   - Returns 429 Too Many Requests with retry_after seconds

5. Shell tool hang (no timeout → 60s kill)
   - Fixed: tokio::time::timeout(60s) on Command::output()
   - Commands that hang are killed and return error

6. Shell tool OOM (unbounded output → 1MB cap)
   - Fixed: stdout/stderr truncated at 1MB with warning
   - Prevents memory exhaustion from verbose commands

7. Provider HTTP timeout (none → 120s request + 10s connect)
   - Fixed: All 5 providers (OpenRouter, Anthropic, OpenAI,
     Ollama, Compatible) now have reqwest timeouts
   - Ollama gets 300s (local models are slower)

949 tests passing, 0 clippy warnings, cargo fmt clean
 2026-02-14 01:47:08 -05:00
argenis de la rosa
b2aff60722 security: pass all 4 checklist items — gateway not public, pairing required, filesystem scoped, tunnel access 
Security checklist from @anshnanda / @ledger_eth:
  ✅ Gateway not public — default bind 127.0.0.1, refuses 0.0.0.0 without
     tunnel or explicit allow_public_bind=true in config
  ✅ Pairing required — one-time 6-digit code printed on startup, exchanged
     for bearer token via POST /pair, enforced on all /webhook requests
  ✅ Filesystem scoped (no /) — workspace_only=true by default, null byte
     injection blocked, 14 system dirs + 4 sensitive dotfiles in forbidden
     list, is_resolved_path_allowed() for symlink escape prevention
  ✅ Access via Tailscale/SSH tunnel — tunnel system integrated, gateway
     refuses public bind without active tunnel

New files:
  src/security/pairing.rs — PairingGuard with OTP generation, constant-time
    code comparison, bearer token issuance, token persistence

Changed files:
  src/config/schema.rs — GatewayConfig (require_pairing, allow_public_bind,
    paired_tokens), expanded AutonomyConfig forbidden_paths
  src/config/mod.rs — export GatewayConfig
  src/gateway/mod.rs — public bind guard, pairing enforcement on /webhook,
    /pair endpoint, /health no longer leaks version/memory info
  src/security/policy.rs — null byte blocking, is_resolved_path_allowed(),
    expanded forbidden_paths (14 system dirs + 4 dotfiles)
  src/security/mod.rs — export pairing module
  src/onboard/wizard.rs — wire gateway config

935 tests passing (up from 905), 0 clippy warnings, cargo fmt clean
 2026-02-14 00:39:51 -05:00